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Abstract
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contracting restrictions of this type is that exclusion imposes negative externalities on individuals not
party to the original loan contract. We explore the ability of such externalities to account for these
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financial systems. We also consider “behavioral” agents who underestimate their chances of being
punished, and show that overconfidence of this type is a less compelling justification for restrictions on
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Abstract
In most contemporary economies loan contracts cannot mandate imprisonment or other non-pecuniary punishments for defaulting debtors. A possible
rationale for contracting restrictions of this type is that imprisonment imposes
negative externalities on individuals not party to the original loan contract. We
explore the ability of such externalities to account for the legal restriction that
private contracts cannot threaten non-pecuniary punishments.

We consider

both the “classical” case in which the negative externality is imposed on future
trading partners, and the “behavioral” case in which the negative externality
is imposed on an agent’s future self.
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Introduction

A great deal of recent research in contract theory has focused on what has become
known as “contractual incompleteness.” By this, economists mean that certain contingencies are impossible to include in private contracts.1 However, a second — and
perhaps equally important — limitation on private contracting has received much less
attention: severe restrictions are placed by the state on the punishments that can
be imposed on a party that breaches a contract.

That is, a contract cannot stip-

ulate corporal punishment or imprisonment. Instead, parties can make use of only
monetary incentives, which by their nature are limited. Such contracting restrictions potentially have large and important effects.

In particular, if loan contracts

could threaten defaulting borrowers with imprisonment, credit constraints would be
ameliorated and perhaps even eliminated.2
In this paper we examine the extent to which the above restrictions on private
contracting can be rationalized by a simple economic explanation, namely that the
prohibited punishments would impose negative externalities on other individuals not
party to the original contract.

We consider two versions of this basic argument.

To fix ideas, consider the specific (and standard) case of a would-be entrepreneur
endowed with an investment opportunity, but lacking funds. The entrepreneur can
raise financing by promising some share of future output to a lender. However, if the
amount promised (i.e., the interest rate) is too high, the entrepreneur’s incentive to
exert effort is low, and overall surplus is negatively impacted.
In the first and more “classical” version of the externality argument, the entrepreneur can reduce the interest rate by agreeing to be imprisoned if he defaults.
1
2

See, e.g., Hart (1995) for a survey.
Under many circumstances, welfare losses due to credit constraints and agency problems would

disappear (or nearly so) if arbitrary punishments were possible.
Mookherjee and Png (1989).

See, e.g., Mirrlees (1999) and

The lender accepts the interest rate reduction because he knows the threat of imprisonment will induce the entrepreneur to work hard. However, with some probability
the entrepreneur still defaults and is imprisoned.

In this event, any third individ-

ual who would have derived positive surplus from interacting with the entrepreneur
is negatively impacted. This negative externality provides a potential rationale for
legal constraints on contracting.
Although simple, this externality-rationale delivers predictions that are broadly
consistent with the observed incidence of contracting constraints. First, the negative
externality is larger when the growth rate of the economy is high, when uncertainty
about the value of future economic interactions is high, and when the number of possible future economic interactions is large. These predictions provide an explanation
for why debtor’s prison was eliminated in the U.S. and western Europe at roughly the
same time as industrialization occurred. Second, collateral seizure — like debtor’s
prison — also imposes negative externalities on other individuals (it reduces the entrepreneur’s ability to pledge collateral in the future), but is largely unrestricted.
Our analysis provides an explanation for this asymmetry — see Section 5.
Second, we examine a more “behavioral” version of the externality argument, in
which the entrepreneur overestimates his probability of success.3

Here, the exter-

nality is suffered by the entrepreneur’s own future self. Again, this externality can
potentially motivate legal restrictions on contracting. However, we also show that
this argument is subject to important caveats. In particular, an entrepreneur who
is persistently overconfident will overestimate not just his probability of success on
today’s project, but also the value of his time in the future. As such, he overestimates the cost of debtor’s prison. We show that under some circumstances the net
effect is that an overconfident agent makes too little (rather than too much) use of
3

For recent research on financing overconfident entrepreneurs, see, e.g., Gervais and Goldstein

(2006), Hackbarth (2004), and Landier and Thesmar (Forthcoming).
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punishments such as imprisonment.
Arguably the main alternative to the externality-based arguments we consider
is that restrictions on punishments stem from ethical concerns.

This argument

seems at best incomplete, because it overlooks the fact that the state regularly uses
imprisonment as a punishment for other offenses, even ones of a non-violent nature.
Thus a debtor who consumes his loan instead of investing it and repaying his creditor
cannot be imprisoned; while in a directly analogous setting a taxpayer who fails to pay
his “debt” to the government may well suffer just such a punishment.4 Additionally,
it is not immediately clear why a greater ethical problem arises in imposing a (mild)
physical punishment on an individual than in stripping the same individual of valuable
collateral. The later sanction is, of course, entirely legal in almost all contemporary
economies.
At the same that the state persists in its use of non-monetary punishments, avenues by which contracting parties can at least partially replicate their use have been
closed. Debtors’ prisons no longer exist. Indentured servitude is banned. Related,
personal bankruptcy prevents a creditor from exercising a claim on future earnings.
Even specific performance is rarely imposed on a breaching party, and the use of noncompete clauses in labor contracts is subject to severe restrictions (and in California,
is banned altogether).5
A second drawback to explaining punishment restrictions on ethical grounds is
that constraints on the use of non-monetary punishments are a historically recent
phenomenon.

In describing the enforcement of indentured servitude contracts in

early colonial America, Galenson (1984) notes that “[i]n 1612, the colony’s governor
4

If instead punishment restrictions arise from a need to control negative externalities, it is clearly

possible for the state to both restrict their use by private parties, but to deploy them itself under
some circumstances.
5
See, e.g., Garmaise (2006).
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dealt firmly with some recaptured laborers: ‘Some he appointed to be hanged Some
burned Some to be broken upon wheles, others to be staked and some to be shott to
death.’ ” Morgan (1975) considers physical punishments the main incentive device
used to motivate indentured laborers. And as Chwe (1990) notes, “whipping Asian
laborers was standard practice on Hawaiian sugar plantations well into this century.”
Our paper is closest to the small literature that has examined a much milder restriction on private contracts, namely the non-enforceability of penalty clauses for
breach. Aghion and Bolton (1987), Chung (1992), and Spier and Whinston (1995)
are leading examples, all of which seek to account for this restriction as stemming
from the fact that penalty clauses, while privately optimal, may be socially undesirable. In each case the social undesirability stems from the fact that penalty clauses
can be used to deter entry into an industry. Also related is Diamond and Maskin
(1979) who study the effects of penalty clauses on search and breach intensity in the
labor market.

Aghion and Hermalin (1990) and Spier (1992) have suggested that

contractual constraints, among them constraints on punishments, exist as a way to
prevent socially unproductive signalling.
Conceptually, our approach shares some elements of commonality with Camerer
et al (2003), who seek to account for when apparently paternalistic policies (of which
restrictions on non-monetary punishments is one example) can be justified on the
grounds that they help boundedly rational agents more than they hurt rational agents.
In common with Section 6 of the current paper, Hynes (2004) points out that the
implications of exactly what inefficiencies might stem from assuming that individuals
are boundedly rational are less obvious than they might at first seem. Finally, Chwe
(1990) characterizes conditions under which the use of physical violence to provide
incentives is privately optimal; in contrast, our focus is on when such punishments
are privately optimal but socially sub-optimal.

4

2

Model

We aim to develop a simple model that can account for legal restrictions on nonpecuniary punishments.

A key difference between pecuniary and non-pecuniary

punishments is that the former generally do not disrupt an individual’s future productivity.

(A partial exception is collateral seizure, which we consider in detail

in Section 5.)

In contrast, non-pecuniary incentives can have severe effects.

Im-

prisonment and capital punishment are the clearest examples, since they absolutely
eliminate an individual’s future output.

Corporal punishment, by causing bodily

harm, will likewise tend to reduce an individual’s future productivity. For want of a
better word, we describe such punishments as exclusionary: in one way or another,
they act to exclude an individual from future productive activity.
On the one hand, exclusionary punishments incentivize an agent to work. On the
other hand, they impose a cost on the agent and his future trading partners. To
make the analysis as transparent as possible, we use the simplest model capable of
capturing this trade-off.
There are two periods and three individuals — one agent, A, (the entrepreneur
in the example of the introduction) and two principals, P1 and P2 (e.g., lenders). In
each period t ∈ {1, 2} the agent A can contract with principal Pt , or can operate a
backyard technology that produces w. If he contracts with principal Pt , he can either
exert high effort, i.e., “work,” or low effort, i.e., “shirk.” If he shirks, output is H > 0
with probability p, and output is 0 with probability 1 − p.

High effort raises the

probability of output H by ∆p, but requires effort Bt from the agent. Throughout,
we assume that high effort is socially efficient, i.e., ∆pH ≥ Bt . We assume also that
the surplus produced when the agent contracts with the principal but shirks exceeds
the backyard technology output,
pH − 1 − w > 0.
5

(1)

The agent and both principals are risk neutral. The agent is restricted to have nonnegative consumption. A contract in period t specifies principal Pt ’s share of high
output, H − xt , and the agent’s share, xt .
(Without loss, we assume the agent receives nothing when output 0 is realized.
Moreover, the agent cannot receive a negative amount: we assume he has no savings,
and the only way to force him to borrow would be to threaten him with a nonpecuniary punishment — as in the contract under consideration.)
In addition to monetary incentives, principal P1 has the option of taking some
action that serves to deny the agent access to the period 2 labor market. As discussed
above, corporal punishment, imprisonment and non-compete clauses all fall within
this class.

Accordingly, at date 1 the contract is a pair (x1 , π), where π is the

probability that the agent is excluded in period 2 if the low output is realized. (Again
without loss, we can assume the agent is never excluded if the high output is realized.)
For simplicity, assume that there is no discounting, and that the agent cannot
store any payments received in period 1 in order to ease the second period incentive
problem.

Let U2 be the agent’s expected utility in period 2, provided he is not

excluded. The agent’s period 1 incentive constraint is thus
(p + ∆p)(x1 + U2 ) + (1 − p − ∆p)(1 − π)U2 − B1 ≥ p(x1 + U2 ) + (1 − p)(1 − π)U2 ,
which reduces to
(x1 + πU2 ) ∆p ≥ B1 .

(IC1 )

We assume that in both periods the project is only possible if the principal supplies
a unit of capital. Thus the principals’ individual rationality constraints are
(p + ∆p) (H − xt ) ≥ 1

(Pt -IR-W)

if the contract induces the agent to exert high effort, and
p (H − xt ) ≥ 1
6

(Pt -IR-S)

otherwise. In order to focus on the interesting case in which the contracting parties
use exclusionary contracts, we assume throughout that there is no way to supply the
agent with purely monetary incentives in period 1 that both induce him to exert high
effort and satisfy principal 1’s individual rationality constraint (P1 -IR-W):


B1
(p + ∆p) H −
− 1 < 0.
∆p

(2)

Finally, since some surplus is available at both dates, we need to specify how this
surplus will be split. We adopt the standard randomized “take-it-or-leave-it” offers
framework.

That is, in period t with probability θt the agent proposes a contract

to principal Pt , who either accepts or rejects. Similarly, with probability 1 − θ t the
principal Pt proposes a contract to the agent, who either accepts or rejects.

3

Contracts and tomorrow’s trading partners

We start by illustrating the basic externality at work: when the agent and principal
P1 agree to use an exclusionary contract (π > 0) to incentivize the agent, they are
imposing a cost on principal P2 who no longer gets a share of the surplus in period 2.
Because of this, if left unregulated the agent and principal P1 will use exclusionary
contracts more than is socially optimal.
Throughout this section, we maintain the same assumptions about technology
in period 2 as we do for period 1: in particular, since exclusionary penalties are
unavailable in the last period, it is impossible to give the agent incentives to work
in period 2 and simultaneously satisfy principal 2’s individual rationality constraint
(Pt -IR-W). That is, we assume that (2) holds when B2 replaces B1 . Given this, the
agent’s period 2 surplus is
U2 = θ2 (pH − 1) + (1 − θ2 ) w = w + θ2 (pH − 1 − w)
7

The overall social surplus when the agent shirks in period 1 is
SW no−inc = pH − 1 + SW2
where here SW2 = pH − 1; while the social surplus when he works, with a contract
specifying a probability of exclusion π, is
SW inc (π) = (p + ∆p) H − 1 − B1 + (1 − (1 − p − ∆p) π) SW2
Thus
SW inc (π) − SW no−inc = ∆pH − B1 − (1 − p − ∆p) πSW2
Agent makes offer in period 1
First, consider the case in which the agent makes the contract offer in period 1. If he
offers a contract with enough incentives to work, he sets x1 as high as possible while
satisfying principal P1 ’s individual rationality constraint, (Pt -IR-W), i.e.,
x1 = H −

1
,
p + ∆p

(3)

and the probability of exclusion as low as possible while satisfying his own incentive
constraint (IC1 ), i.e.,
πU2 + x1 =

B1
∆p

(4)

So
πU2 =

B1
1
−H +
∆p
p + ∆p

(5)

which is strictly positive by assumption (2). The agent’s utility from such a contract
is
U inc = (p + ∆p) x1 − B1 + (1 − (1 − p − ∆p) π) U2
= (p + ∆p) H − 1 − B1 + U2 − (1 − p − ∆p) πU2
8

On the other hand, the agent can simply propose x1 = H −

1
p

and π = 0, which

by assumption (2) fails to supply sufficient incentives to induce him to work. The
agent’s utility is then
U no−inc = px1 − 1 + U2 = pH − 1 + U2
Thus the agent’s gain from offering a contract with a enough incentives to get him to
work is the increase in expected output (since he makes the offer, he is the residual
claimant), net of the cost of working B1 , and the expected cost of exclusion:
U inc − U no−inc = ∆pH − B1 − (1 − p − ∆p) πU2
So


U inc − U no−inc − SW inc (π) − SW no−inc = (1 − p − ∆p) (πSW2 − πU2 ) > 0

That is, the agent’s private gains from using an exclusionary contract always exceed
the social gains. In slightly more detail,
Proposition 1 (Agent’s bias)
The agent views the gain from supplying incentives using an exclusionary contract as
higher than the social gains by an amount






B1
SW2
1
−1
(p + ∆p)
−H +1
−1
p + ∆p
∆p
U2

(6)

The bias is more pronounced when the agent’s period 2 bargaining power is lower and
when his period 2 “outside option” w is lower. The bias tends to 0 as as the agent’s
period 2 bargaining power approaches 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: Substituting in for π from (5) gives the agent’s bias in
favor of using an exclusionary contract (6). Increasing either θ2 or w increases U2 ,
which reduces the bias.
9

Will the agent’s bias actually lead him to propose an exclusionary contract when
it is socially inefficient to do so?6 The answer is yes. From above, the exclusionary
contract is socially efficient if and only of
∆pH − B1 ≥ (1 − p − ∆p) πSW2
where we know that π is a linear and increasing function in B1 . Define B0 as the
value of B1 at which pure wage incentives can be used to incentivize the agent, i.e.
(2) holds at equality. So there exists B ∗ > B0 such that an exclusionary contract is
socially efficient if and only if B1 ∈ [B0 , B ∗ ]. See Figure 1.
6 ∆pH − B
1

SW2 π (1 − (p + ∆p))

@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
U2 π (1 − (p + ∆p))

@

@ 

@
 @

@


@


@

@
-

B
B ∗ BA
0
Socially efficient incentive contract


∆pH

B1

-

Privately efficient incentive contract

Figure 1: Use of incentive contract when agent makes offer in period 1
Similarly, an exclusionary contract is attractive to the agent if and only if
∆pH − B1 ≥ (1 − p − ∆p) πU2
6

In principle, it is possible that the bias tends to zero as the social inefficiency from the exclu-

sionary contract tends to zero.
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So again, there exists a BA > B0 such that an exclusionary contract is used by private
contracting parties if and only if B1 ∈ [B0 , BA ]. And from Proposition 1 we know
that BA > B ∗ . So we have established:
Proposition 2 (Misuse of exclusionary contracts)
If B1 ∈ (B ∗ , BA ] and the agent makes the contract proposal, then an exclusionary
contract is used even though it is socially inefficient.7
Principal makes offer in period 1
Propositions 1 and 2 characterize the social inefficiencies that can arise when the
agent has the ability to propose a period 1 contract that includes the threat of an
exclusionary punishment. One might be tempted to conjecture that the inefficiencies
are even worse when instead principal P1 has the bargaining power. In Proposition
3 below, however, we show this is not necessarily the case.
When principal P1 offers a contract (x1 , π) that supplies sufficient incentives to
induce the agent to work, his utility is V inc = (p + ∆p) (H − x1 ) − 1, while if the
contract does not offer sufficient incentives to work, V no−inc = pH − 1 − w. Thus
V inc − V no−inc = ∆pH − (p + ∆p) x1 + w

(7)

The agent’s utility from a contract (x1 , π) that induces him to work is
(p + ∆p) x1 − B1 + (1 − (1 − p − ∆p) π) U2
The agent’s reservation utility is w + U2 .

Rewriting, it follows that the agent’s

individual rationality constraint is
(p + ∆p) (x1 + πU2 ) − B1 ≥ w + πU2
7

There is also the constraint π ≤ 1, which implies B ≤ B̄.
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(A-IR1 )

Out of the various possible exclusionary contracts, the principal P1 will certainly
offer one in which the incentive constraint (IC1 ) holds at equality — for otherwise,
the principal could simultaneously reduce both π and x without violating the agent’s
constraint (A-IR1 ).

Moreover, the individual rationality constraint (A-IR1 ) must

itself hold at equality unless the principal has maxed out on the punishment and
π = 1 — since otherwise the principal could increase π and reduce x without violating
constraint (IC1 ).

From the incentive constraint (IC1 ) it follows that x1 + πU2 =

B1 /∆p. The exclusion probability π is then set to
π = max



(p + ∆p) (x1 + πU2 ) − B1 − w
,1
U2



( pB

1

= max

∆p

−w

U2

)

,1 .

Our main result is:
Proposition 3 (Principal 1’s bias is smaller)
The principal P1 proposes an exclusionary contract over a strictly smaller region of
the parameter space than does the agent.
At first sight, this result might appear surprising: after all, principal P1 does not
care directly about whether or not the agent is excluded from working in period 2, and
so one might guess that the principal would be more inclined to use an exclusionary
contract.
To understand Proposition 3, it is useful to start by noting that the result does
not say that the agent is excluded with higher probability when the principal has the
bargaining power. Specifically, suppose that parameters are such that both the principal and agent would propose an exclusionary contract. Under these circumstances,
the principal proposes a contract with a higher exclusion probability — exactly as
one would expect.8
8

To see this, recall that the agent’s incentive constraint (IC1 ) holds at equality, regardless of who
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Instead, what Proposition 3 does say is that there are conditions under which the
agent would propose an exclusionary contract but the principal would not. Loosely
speaking, the reason is that quite a high exclusion probability is required to give
principal P1 more than pH − 1 − w, his payoff under a non-exclusionary contract
when he makes the contract offer. As such, an exclusionary contract only benefits
principal P1 if it is quite socially costly — and this makes the contract less likely to
be viable.
In more detail, suppose that parameter values are such that the agent is exactly
indifferent between proposing an exclusionary contract and a non-exclusionary contract. The expected utility of principal P1 is 0, and the expected utility of the agent
is pH − 1 + U2. Now, suppose that the principal P1 instead makes the contract offer.
His equilibrium expected utility must be at least pH −1−w > 0. To achieve this, the
contract must offer the agent a lower monetary transfer than when the agent makes
the offer. To supply incentives for the agent to work, the principal-proposed contract
would then have to threaten a higher probability of exclusion.

But the combined

utility of the principal P1 and the agent is then strictly lower than when the agent
makes the offer.

As such, there is no exclusionary contract that can provide the

required reservation utilities of w + U2 to the agent and pH − 1 − w to principal P1 .
Proof of Proposition 3: There are two cases to consider: π = 1 and π < 1. First,
consider the (easier) case π = 1. Here, the payment x1 = B1 /∆p − U2 and so from
(7)
V

inc

−V

no−inc

= ∆pH − (p + ∆p)



B1
− U2
∆p



+ w.

makes the contract offer. Since the principal’s expected payoff is clearly higher when he makes the
proposal, the monetary transfer x is lower in this case — and so the exclusion probability is in turn
higher, for otherwise the incentive constraint would not hold.
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Since π = 1 is equivalent to pB1 /∆p − w ≥ U2 ,
V inc − V no−inc ≤ ∆pH − B1 − (1 − p − ∆p) U2 ≤ U inc − U no−inc .
Second, consider the case π < 1.

Here, x1 = w +

(1−p)B1
∆p

and πU2 =

B1
∆p

− x1 .

Straightforward algebraic manipulation implies
V no−inc = U no−inc − (w + U2 )

V inc = U inc − (w + U2 ) (p + ∆p) .

Clearly if U inc < w + U2 < pH − 1 + U2 = U no−inc then the agent will never propose
an exclusionary contract, and nor will principal P1 since V inc < 0.

On the other

hand, if U inc ≥ w + U2 then we have

V inc − V no−inc = U inc − U no−inc − (1 − p − ∆p) U inc − (w + U2 ) ≤ U inc − U no−inc .
Propositions 1 and 3 together imply that constraints on contractual punishments
are more likely to be appropriate when the agent is in a relatively powerful bargaining
position today, but will not be tomorrow.

4

Uncertainty, growth and mobility

Historically, the introduction of restrictions on exclusionary punishments roughly
coincides with industrialization. Important features of industrialization include not
just an increase in the overall growth rate, but also an increase in uncertainty and
mobility.

In this section we extend our basic model to account for these features,

and examine the implications for the desirability of contracting restrictions.
Specifically, suppose that the value of principal P2 ’s project is stochastic, with a
positive probability that pH − 1 < w.

This uncertainty is publicly resolved after
14

period 1, but before period 2. So the expected social surplus when the agent is not
excluded is
SW2 = E [max {pH − 1, w}] ,
while the agent’s expected utility is
U2 = w + θE [max {pH − 1 − w, 0}] = (1 − θ) w + θSW2 .
What effect does this have on the inefficiency, or otherwise, of private contracting
decisions?

We focus for now on the case where the agent has all the bargaining

power in period 1. On the one hand, note that
U inc − U no−inc = ∆pH − B1 − (1 − p − ∆p) πU2


B1
1
= ∆pH − B1 − (1 − p − ∆p)
−H +
,
∆p
p + ∆p
so that the agent’s decision as to whether or not to use an exclusionary contract is
independent of the surplus available in period 2. On the other hand, it is immediate
from Proposition 1 that the magnitude of the agent’s bias in favor of exclusionary
contracts is increasing in the social surplus SW2 . Thus we have:
Corollary 1 (Growth and uncertainty)
Both (1) an increase in the growth rate (higher expected pH in period 2), and (2) an
increase in uncertainty in the value of second period pH, in the sense of second-order
stochastic dominance, increases the agent’s bias (relative to the social optimum) in
favor of using an exclusionary contract.
Historically, this is consistent with the fact that moves to circumvent the private use of exclusionary contracts have generally coincided with periods of increasing
growth and change.
Moreover, note from the proof of Proposition 3 that when principal P1 makes an
offer, then whenever increasing the social surplus SW2 increases the agent’s expected
15

utility U2 , it will result in the principal being more likely to choose an exclusionary
contract — while at the same time making it less likely that such a contract is socially
efficient.
In particular, one economic and social change that may lead both to higher growth
and greater uncertainty is an increase in mobility. Specifically, suppose that instead
of having the opportunity just to deal with principal P2 at date 2, the agent can
choose instead to deal with a third principal P2′ who has a project with expected
output p′ H ′ . In this case the agent’s expected surplus is
U2 = w + θE [max {pH − 1 − w, p′ H ′ − 1 − w, 0}]
This gives:
Corollary 2 (Increased mobility)
An increase in the agent’s employment options at date 2 increases the agent’s bias
(relative to the social optimum) in favor of using an exclusionary contract.
A brief history of debtor’s prisons in the United States
Although sometimes regarded as a medieval institution, imprisonment for debt persisted into the nineteenth century in the United States.9 Mann (2002, page 79)
summarizes the situation in United States shortly after independence in the following
terms: “every colony north of the Potomac, with the possible exception of New Hampshire, permitted insolvent debtors to be bound in service to their creditors without
their consent, typically for as long as seven years, the standard term for indentured
9

The closely related institution of bound labor was not abolished until 1867 Antipeonage Act,

i.e., after slavery had been abolished in the United States. A concise legal history can be found in
the Supreme Court case of Pollock vs Williams (322 U.S. 4).

16

servants.” New York did not abolish imprisonment for indebtedness until 1831, and
Pennsylvania did not do so until 1842.10
However, as early as the mid-eighteenth century there had been calls for the
abolishment of debtor’s prison.11 For example, a 1754 Rhode Island pamphlet,12
“The Ill Policy and Inhumanity of Imprisoning Insolvent Debtors, Fairly Stated and
Discussed” stated that
it is best for Society, that his Creditors receive a Proportion of their Debts
... and his Person be sat at Liberty to seek new Employment; or that his
Body be imprisoned for the Deficiency, until he pays the utmost Farthing,
which is impossible?
The reference to society as a whole, and to new employment, seem very much in
the same spirit as our more formal analysis above.

5

Non-exclusionary punishments

Up to now we have been concerned only with the use of exclusionary punishments.
In practice, agents can also be punished in non-exclusionary ways. Collateral seizure
is a leading example.
Although collateral seizure is not itself exclusionary, it may generate exclusionarylike effects (see, e.g., Ayotte 2007). Consider the case in which the agent has enough
10
11

See Mann (2002, page 106).
There is also some evidence that conditions for debt imprisonment eased prior to the 1830s.

Coleman (1965) and Randall (1952) both report that insolvent debtors were released once all their
property had been handed over. That is, imprisonment was used only to enforce collateral collection.
Feer (1961) reports that as early as 1737, in Massachusetts debtors were no longer bound to work
for creditors to repay their debt.
12
See Mann (2002, page 83.
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collateral to sign an incentive contract even in the second period. Then if the first
principal seizes this collateral, an incentive contract is no longer possible in the second
period. The agent is effectively “excluded” from working in an incentivized way.
In practice, legal constraints on collateral seizure are much weaker than constraints
on purely exclusionary punishments. In this section we extend our basic model to
offer an explanation.
Specifically, suppose the agent has collateral (a house, for example) with value
K ≥ w to the agent. Assume that it is non-divisible, and that both principals P1 and
P2 can impose randomized seizure of the house as a punishment for low output. Let
χ1 and χ2 be the probabilities of seizure by the two principals respectively.
In order to ensure that collateral is economically relevant, we assume that
H−

1
Bt
+K ≥
,
p + ∆p
∆p

so that if the principal receives the minimum amount consistent with his individual
rationality constraint (i.e.,

1
p+∆p

when output is high), there is a collateral seizure

probability χt ≤ 1 that gives the agent enough incentives.

For expositional ease,

we focus on the case in which the agent has all the bargaining power in period 1.
Finally, we also assume that K has zero-value to the principals.

This assumption

is made solely to make the punishment K as closely comparable to the exclusionary
punishment as possible, and our results would actually be strengthened if K were
valued by the principal.
The comparative social costs of collateral seizure and exclusion
When principal P1 provides the agent with incentives, he does so by threatening
to impose a punishment (collateral seizure or exclusion) on the agent with some
probability (χ1 and π respectively).

When the agent proposes the contract, he
18

1
proposes x1 = H − p+∆p
regardless of which punishment device is used. The expected

punishment incurred by the agent when output is low must then satisfy
∆p (x1 + (cost of punishment to agent) × (prob. of punishment)) = B1 .
The equilibrium social cost is then
social cost of punishment
×
cost of punishment to agent




B1
− x1 .
∆p

Since x1 is independent of the type of punishment used, the social cost is minimized
when the ratio of the social cost of punishment to the agent’s disutility from the
punishment is minimized.
Notationally, let U2K and U2−K respectively denote the agent’s expected utility in
period 2 when he still has collateral, and when he does not. Likewise, let SW2K and
SW2−K denote the expected social welfare.

When the punishment threatened by

principal P1 is exclusion in period 2,
SW2K
social cost of punishment
=
,
cost of punishment to agent
U2K
while when the punishment threatened by principal P1 is collateral seizure,
social cost of punishment
SW2K − SW2−K + K
=
.
cost of punishment to agent
U2K − U2−K + K
Proposition 4 (Social loss from exclusionary punishments is worse)
If K ≥ w, the social loss of using the exclusionary punishment to incentivize the agent
in period 1 is greater than the social loss of using collateral seizure.
Proof of Proposition 4: From the discussion prior to the Proposition statement,
we must show
SW2K
K + SW2K − SW2−K
>
U2K
K + U2K − U2−K
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or equivalently,



SW2K − U2K K > U2K SW2K − SW2−K − SW2K U2K − U2−K .

(8)

When the agent makes the contract offer in period 2 he captures all the social surplus,
while when the principal makes the offer the agent’s individual rationality constraint
binds. So U2K and SW2K are related by
U2K = SW2K − (1 − θ) ((social surplus with collateral when P2 makes offer) − w) .
When the agent has no collateral in period 2, it is impossible to provide the agent
with incentives and the social surplus is SW2−K = pH − 1 regardless of who makes
the offer. So

Consequently,


U2−K = SW2−K − (1 − θ) SW2−K − w .

U2K −U2−K = SW2K −SW2−K −(1 − θ) (social surplus with collateral when P2 makes offer) − SW2−K
and (8) rewrites to

((social surplus with collateral when P2 makes offer) − w) K + SW2K − SW2−K

> (social surplus with collateral when P2 makes offer) − SW2−K SW2K .
(9)

If when principal P2 makes the contract offer he proposes a contract which does

not provide the agent with incentives, the right-hand side of (9) is zero, and so the
inequality is satisfied since certainly SW2K > U2K . If instead principal P2 proposes
a contract that provides the agent with incentives, it is straightforward to show that
the agent does so also. (The basic argument is the same as for Proposition 3.) So
in this case, the period 2 social surplus with collateral is independent of who makes
the offer, and equals SW2K . Inequality (9) reduces to


K SW2K − w > w SW2K − SW2−K ,
20

which is certainly satisfied since K ≥ w and SW2−K = pH − 1 > w by (1).

Contracting constraints
Proposition 4 above says that using collateral to provide incentives imposes lower
social costs than does using exclusionary threats to achieve the same end. This suggests that legal constraints on the use of punishments should be targeted at reducing
the use of exclusionary contracts.
Here, we consider optimal punishment constraints in a very simple policy environment. In particular, we assume that the only feasible constraints are all-or-nothing
in nature — in the sense that either a complete ban is placed on using an incentive
device (collateral seizure or exclusion or both) or no restriction is imposed at all.
We will establish:
Proposition 5 (No total ban on seizing collateral)
It is never an optimal policy to ban principals from seizing the agent’s collateral K.
Proof of Proposition 5: The key step in proving Proposition 5 is to show that it
is always better to ban just exclusionary penalties and allow collateral seizure than
to ban both. To see this, consider total social surplus when just collateral seizure is
allowed. If the agent does not propose collateral seizure in one period, he will not do
so in the other; and so neither will principal P2 .13 In this case, a ban on collateral
seizure has no impact. If instead the agent proposes collateral seizure in one period,
he will do so in both. In this case, social surplus is

13


(p + ∆p) H − B1 − 1 − (1 − p − ∆p) χ1 K + SW2K − SW2−K + SW2K

We are assuming that in period 1 the agent always proposes the contract. However, if the agent

does not propose collateral seizure in period 1, neither would principal P1 .
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= (p + ∆p) H − B1 − 1 − (1 − p − ∆p) χ1 K + U2K − U2−K


− (1 − p − ∆p) χ1 SW2K − SW2−K − U2K − U2−K + SW2K .

(10)

Here, we have decomposed the expected social loss of imposing the punishment,

i.e. (1 − p − ∆p) χ1 K + SW2K − SW2−K , into the deadweight loss inflicted on the

agent, (1 − p − ∆p) χ1 K + U2K − U2−K , and the remainder. Observe the deadweight loss inflicted the agent must be less than the agent’s expected gain from using
the incentive contract, which is ∆pH − B1 . It follows that expression (10) exceeds

(p + ∆p) H − B1 − 1 − (∆pH − B1 ) − SW2K − SW2−K + SW2K = pH − 1 + SW2−K

which is exactly the social surplus available if both possible punishments are banned.
To complete the proof, we must also show that it is better to ban exclusion and
allow collateral seizure than to ban collateral seizure and allow exclusion. Suppose
first that when exclusion is allowed, it is used in the period 1 contract. In this case,
collateral seizure would be used in the period 1 contract if it were allowed. It follows
directly from Proposition 4 that social surplus is higher when exclusion is banned
since collateral seizure is less socially costly.

Moreover, allowing collateral seizure

directly increases period 2 surplus when the agent still has collateral in that period.
Finally, if exclusion is not used in equilibrium even when it is allowed, social surplus
when collateral seizure is banned is simply pH − 1 + SW2−K — and we have already
shown that allowing collateral seizure leads to a higher social surplus.
The basic intuition for Proposition 5 is as follows. The externality produced by
collateral seizure is that with some probability principal P2 is left unable to incentivize
the agent to work. Under an outright ban on collateral seizure, however, principal
P2 can never incentivize the agent. Of course, collateral seizure also imposes a deadweight cost in that the agent values the collateral more than the principal14 — but this
14

As noted, for expositional ease we have made the extreme assumption that the principal does
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component of the cost is internalized by the agent. It follows that banning collateral
pledging can only reduce social welfare.
In our model, a lawmaker might still like to ban collateral seizure by principal
P1 , while continuing to allow it for principal P2 . Nonetheless, Proposition 4 above
shows that in many circumstances banning exclusionary punishments should still be
a higher priority, even if finer-tuned policies of this type are possible. And in practice,
it may not straightforward for a legal system to identify whether or not a particular
principal is P1 or P2 .
In contrast to Proposition 5, from Proposition 4 and our previous analysis we know
it may be optimal to ban the use of exclusionary punishments. Doing so leads the
period 1 contracting parties to switch to using collateral seizure to provide incentives,
which are typically less socially damaging.

6

Over-confidence

We now turn to a second “externality” explanation that is often proposed for courts’
refusal to enforce exclusionary contracts, namely that this is to protect agents from
their own over-confidence. This is an old idea — as long ago as 1935, McCormick
wrote in his legal treatise that:15
It is a characteristic of men, however, that they are likely to be beguiled
by the “illusions of hope,” and so feel so certain of their ability to carry
out their engagements in future, that their confidence leads them to be
willing to make extravagant promises and commitments as to what they
are willing to suffer if they fail.
not value the collateral at all.
15
See page 601.
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Many recent studies support this claim, by showing that individuals systematically
overestimate their skill.16
Although the idea that contracting constraints are needed to protect agents from
themselves is intuitive, in this section we will exhibit what we view as three important
caveats.
First, even if the agent overestimates the benefits of the incentive contract relative
to the no-incentive contract, the social costs related to him mistakenly choosing the
incentive contract are reduced by over-confidence. The reason is that overconfident
agents need less high-powered incentives, and so the exclusion probability π can be
set lower.
Second, and related, if the degree of over-confidence is large enough then there
may be no need for an exclusionary contract at all. Of course, overconfident agents
may still sign up for incentive contracts when they should not do so; but now this
represents an aggregate social benefit, since working is socially efficient.
Third, if an individual is persistently overconfident of his ability this will lead
him not just to underestimate the risk of failure today, but tomorrow also.

The

consequence of this is that he overestimates the value of not being excluded. This
leads him to act more cautiously when considering the merits of an exclusionary
contract.
Assumptions
Formally, we assume that an agent (incorrectly) believes that by exerting effort he
can raise the probability of success by ∆q > ∆p. Moreover, the agent is aware that
others do not share this opinion, i.e., he knows that principals believe that effort only
16

To give just one (well-known) example, individuals systematically overestimate their driving

ability — see Svenson (1981).
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raises the success probability by ∆p. Finally, we assume that principals know that
they are dealing with an overconfident agent, and that this fact is common knowledge.
In this section we want to explore the ability of overconfidence, as opposed to externalities, to account for observed restrictions on contracting. To cleanly distinguish
the two cases we consider the following variant of our environment:
In period 1 the agent contracts with principal P1 , just as before. Exclusionary
contracts are potentially useful because the agent needs to be given incentives in this
period. For expositional conciseness, we assume that the agent makes the contract
offer in period 1. In period 2, the agent no longer meets a principal. Instead, he
has direct ownership of a productive technology that yields an output (p + ∆p) H − 1
if he exerts effort B2 , and an output of pH − 1 otherwise. If the agent is excluded
as a punishment for low output in period 1, he loses access to this technology, and
receives zero utility.
The key feature of this modified environment is that there is no longer an externalitybased rationale for restricting the use of exclusionary punishments. Now, the agent
bears all the social cost himself. However, the agent’s misperception of the efficacy
of his effort may still generate a socially inefficient outcome if it leads the agent to
accept a greater expected punishment than the social surplus produced by exerting
effort actually justifies.

That is, instead of constraints on contracting serving to

protect future trading partners, any constraints will instead stem from the need to
protect the agent from himself.
Let U2 denote the agent’s true expected utility in period 2, and Û2 the agent’s
belief about U2 . As we will see, U2 and Û2 may differ. In period 1, the agent works
only under a contract (x1 , π) that satisfies



x1 + π Û2 ∆q ≥ B1
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Principal 1 accepts such a contract if and only if
(p + ∆p) (H − x1 ) − 1 ≥ 0
Since the agent proposes the incentive contract, he will always offer
x̂1 = H −

1
p + ∆p

Moreover, whenever exclusion incentives are used (i.e. π > 0) the agent’s preferred
contract (xˆ1 , π̂) satisfies
x̂1 + π̂Û2 =

B1
∆q

Observe that because the agent is overconfident of success, he must be offered fewer
incentives than would otherwise be the case.
Overconfidence-induced social inefficiency
The case that proponents of over-confidence as a basis for contracting constraints
appear to have in mind is that where


B1
(p + ∆p) H −
−1<0
∆q

(11)

and U2 = Û2 . That is, even under over-confidence monetary incentives are insufficient
to persuade the agent to work in period 1, and the agent correctly perceives the period
2 surplus. Under this case, the agent’s perceived welfare from offering his preferred
incentive contract is
Û inc = (p + ∆q) xˆ1 − B1 − (1 − p − ∆q) π̂ Û2 + Û2


= (p + ∆p) H − 1 − B1 − (1 − p − ∆p) π̂ Û2 + Û2 + (∆q − ∆p) xˆ1 + π̂Û2


∆p
inc
= SW + 1 −
B1
∆q
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where SW inc denotes the true social welfare if the incentive contract is used, i.e.,
SW inc = (p + ∆p) H − 1 − B1 − (1 − p − ∆p) π̂U2 + U2
If the incentive contract is not used, the agent’s welfare is
Û no−inc = pH − 1 + Û2 = SW no−inc
The agent believes that the gain in using the incentive contract instead of the noincentive contract is Û inc − Û no−inc . The true gain, both to the agent and to social
welfare, is SW inc − SW no−inc . The agent’s bias in favor of the incentive contract is
consequently





∆p
inc
no−inc
inc
no−inc
Û − Û
− SW − SW
= 1−
B1 > 0
∆q

In this case holds, the “classical” intuition is correct: the agent underestimates the
probability of failure, and so overestimates the value of binding himself using socially
costly incentives. As a consequence, he may wrongly choose to use a contract which
employs the threat of exclusion as an incentive device.
Even in this case, however, the social costs of overconfidence are not monotonic.
In particular, suppose that SW inc − SW no−inc < 0, so that using the exclusionary
contract destroys social surplus. The agent makes the socially efficient decision for
all ∆q below some critical value, δ say. As ∆q increases from just below δ to just
above δ, the social cost of overconfidence becomes positive. However, as ∆q increases
further, the social cost of overconfidence declines, since the exclusion probability π̂
can be lowered.
Do overconfident agents need to be excluded?
A second caveat to the above argument for restrictions on contracting is that for ∆q
large enough it is quite possible for inequality (11) not to hold, even though (2) does.
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In this case, there is simply no need to use exclusion as a punishment, i.e., π̂ = 0,
and overconfidence has no social cost at all.
Overconfidence about tomorrow
A third caveat relates to the agent’s overestimate of the value of tomorrow’s surplus.
Consider again the case where pure monetary incentives cannot be used to induce the
agent to work in period 1, i.e., (11) holds.
Thus far we have assumed that while the agent misperceives the effect of effort
on the success probability today (∆q > ∆p) and so overestimates his expected utility
in period 1, he correctly perceives his expected utility in period 2 (i.e. Û2 = U2 ). In
many respects, however, the more natural assumption is that if the agent is overconfident today he will be overconfident about tomorrow also. In this case, Û2 > U2 .
The important point to note is that overconfidence about tomorrow acts to provide
a countervailing force to the agent’s tendency to sign up for incentive contracts too
often.

He overestimates the cost of exclusion in period 2, and so may actually

under-utilize the incentive contract.
Specifically, consider the case in which the agent believes that effort in either
period 1 or 2 raises the probability of high output by ∆q > ∆p.

In this case,

Û2 − U2 = (∆q − ∆p) H > 0. The agent’s perceived utility in period 1 from using
the incentive contract is now
Û inc = (p + ∆q) x̂1 − B1 − (1 − p − ∆q) π̂Û2 + Û2




= pH − 1 − B1 − (1 − p − ∆p) π̂ Û2 + Û2 + (∆q − ∆p) xˆ1 + π̂ Û2




∆p
B1 + Û2 − U2
= pH − 1 − B1 − (1 − p − ∆p) π̂U2 + U2 + 1 −
∆q


− (1 − p − ∆p) π̂ Û2 − U2
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= SW

inc



∆p
+ 1−
∆q







B1 + Û2 − U2 − (1 − p − ∆p) π̂ Û2 − U2

while


Û no−inc = pH − 1 + Û2 = SW no−inc + Û2 − U2

Thus the agent’s bias in favor of the incentive contract relative to the true gain or
loss in social welfare is







∆p
inc
no−inc
inc
no−inc
Û − Û
− SW − SW
=
1−
B1 − (1 − p − ∆p) π̂ Û2 − U2
∆q


B1
− π̂ (1 − p − ∆p) H (12)
= (∆q − ∆p)
∆q
The direction of the agent’s bias is no longer clear. On the one hand, he underestimates the probability of exclusion. But there is an offsetting effect — he overestimates
the cost that being excluded imposes on him.17
Although it is hard to sign expression (12) in general, we can show that if the
surplus produced without expending effort is small, then an agent who is overconfident
in both periods will never wrongly use an incentive contract:
Proposition 6 (Overconfident agents don’t overuse exclusion punishments)
If the surplus pH − 1 produced by a shirking agent is small enough then an overconfident agent will never use an incentive contract in period 1 when it is in fact socially
suboptimal to do so.
Proof of Proposition 6: First, notice that the incentive contract is only socially
suboptimal if the probability that exclusion is imposed is quite high. That is, since
SW inc − SW no−inc = ∆pH − B1 − (1 − p − ∆p) π̂U2
17

Recall that
π̂ =

1
Û2



B1
1
−H +
∆q
p + ∆p
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.

then SW inc − SW no−inc < 0 is equivalent to
(1 − p − ∆p) π̂ >

∆pH − B1
U2

From expression (12), the agent’s bias in favor of the incentive contract is certainly
less than
(∆q − ∆p)



∆pH − B1
B1
−
H
∆q
U2



Now, B1 /∆q < B1 /∆p < H. To complete the proof, simply note that as pH − 1 → 0
then ∆pH − B1 → U2 , and so the agent’s bias must be actually be negative.

That

is, the agent would not use the incentive contract if it is socially suboptimal to do so.

Contracting constraints
We conclude this section by noting that even when the parameter values are such that
an overconfident agent is wrongly tempted to use an incentive contract that deploys
exclusionary punishments, the implications for optimal constraints on contracting
differ sharply from the externality case explored in Sections 2 - 5.
Our main observation is as follows.

In Section 5 we demonstrated that when

punishment constraints are motivated by externality concerns then there is a much
stronger case to be made for prohibiting the use of exclusionary punishments than
collateral seizure.

The key reason is that, as demonstrated by Proposition 4, the

social cost of exclusionary punishments is greater than the social cost of collateral
seizure. In contrast, no such distinction exists if punishment constraints stem solely
from a desire to protect overconfident agents from themselves.

In this latter case,

the agent fully internalizes the social deadweight loss of any punishment — social
inefficiency, if any, stems only from agents underestimating the probability that the

30

punishment will be imposed. This is true regardless of whether the punishment is
exclusionary, or takes the form of collateral seizure.
In practice lawmakers appear to have been much more concerned with placing restrictions on exclusionary punishments than on collateral seizure. Today most forms
of exclusionary punishment are entirely prohibited. In contrast, only weak constraints
exist to prevent an agent from pledging any collateral he possesses. Moreover, those
restrictions that do exist, such as bankruptcy exemptions in some U.S. states, postdate the abolition of most forms of exclusionary punishments.
We should make clear that we are not arguing that overconfidence plays no role
in the existence of contracting constraints. Instead, our point is that it is hard to see
how overconfidence alone can account for the apparent much greater concern with
restricting the use of what we have termed “exclusionary” punishments than the use
of straightforward collateral seizure.

7

Conclusion

In this paper we have explored the extent to which an important constraint on private
contracting, namely the prohibition of non-pecuniary punishments, can be rationalized by the negative externalities these punishments impose on other individuals.
Both the timing of when punishments such as debtor’s prison were eliminated, and
the fact that collateral seizure is not similarly restricted, are consistent with the implications of our model. Our analysis also indicates that the extent to which behavioral
biases lead to socially inefficient private contracts is more complicated than often
appreciated.
Inevitably our analysis omits some important issues.

Two deserve particular

mention. First, we have assumed throughout that the agent and principal P2 cannot
offer to share the period 2 surplus with principal P1 in exchange for “forgiveness.”
31

Renegotiation of this form has the potential to undo the negative externality at the
heart of the paper. Clearly some forms of non-pecuniary punishment, notably corporal punishment, cannot be renegotiated once they have been inflicted. For other
forms of punishment, such as imprisonment, a version of our results would continue
to hold provided renegotiation is not perfect.
A second issue that we have ignored is the extent to which the outputs of different
individuals are correlated.

Consider an economy populated by a large number of

agents, with projects that are highly correlated. If exclusionary contracts are used
in such an economy, the supply of agents will be substantially reduced when projects
produce low output. As a consequence, the bargaining power of any non-excluded
agent will be raised.

This effect means that, in equilibrium, at least some agents

will refrain from writing socially inefficient exclusionary contracts in period 1, since
given their high bargaining power in period 2 they suffer most of the cost. We leave
a fuller analysis of the equilibrium outcomes of such an economy for future research.
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